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Abstract. The Pigou-Dalton principle demands that a regressive transfer decreases
social welfare. In the unidimensional setting this principle is consistent, because
regressivity in terms of attribute amounts and regressivity in terms of individual
well-being coincide in the case of a single attribute. In the multidimensional setting,
however, the relationship between the various attributes and well-being is complex.
To formulate a multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, a concept of well-
being must therefore ﬁrst be deﬁned. We propose a version of the Pigou-Dalton
principle that deﬁnes regressivity in terms of the individual well-being ranking that
underlies the social ranking on which the principle is imposed. This well-being
ranking (of attribute bundles) is induced from the social ranking over distributions
in which all individuals have the same attribute bundle. It is shown that this new
principle—the consistent Pigou-Dalton principle—imposes a quasi-linear structure
on the well-being ranking. We discuss the implications of this result within the
literature on multidimensional inequality measurement and within the literature on
needs.
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11 Introduction
We consider the problem of ranking social states in a multidimensional setting.
In this setting, a social state is a distribution of attribute bundles over the
individuals in society, one bundle for each individual. It is assumed that these
attribute bundles incorporate all information relevant to the problem and,
hence, that the individuals can be treated as identical except for their attribute
bundles. In addition, all attributes are considered to be good for individuals.
Our focus is on the formulation and examination of a multidimensional
Pigou-Dalton principle, which expresses the social ranking’s basic concern
for inequality between individuals. In the unidimensional setting, the Pigou-
Dalton principle demands that a regressive transfer in the single attribute de-
creases social welfare. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
amount an individual has of the single attribute and her level of well-being,
transfers that are regressive in terms of the attribute are also regressive in
terms of well-being. The latter is what ultimately matters: the Pigou-Dalton
principle basically demands that if a transfer from one individual to another
increases the well-being of the better-oﬀ individual and decreases that of the
worse-oﬀ, then it decreases social welfare.
Two diﬃculties arise when one attempts to carry over the idea of the uni-
dimensional Pigou-Dalton principle to the multidimensional setting. First, it
is not necessarily the case that each of the attributes can be considered as
transferable. More precisely, the idea of a transfer that preserves the total
amount of an attribute in society is not necessarily meaningful and desirable
for all attributes. However, this problem can be straightforwardly solved by
deﬁning the transfer principle only in terms of transferable attributes. The
second problem is less easily tackled: in the multidimensional setting there is
in general no one-to-one correspondence between the level of any one attribute
and the level of well-being (there may even be no explicit concept of individ-
ual well-being at all). To illustrate the diﬃculty, let us consider an example
with two attributes, the ﬁrst transferable, the second not. Individual i has the
attribute bundle (70,50) while individual j has the attribute bundle (120,30).
Suppose now that an amount of the ﬁrst (i.e., the transferable) attribute is
transferred from individual i to individual j. Is this transfer regressive in
terms of individual well-being or not? It is clear that in order to answer this
question, we need to determine whether or not the bundle (70,50) yields a
lower level of well-being than (120,30). In other words, to deﬁne an appropri-
ate multidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle, we need a ranking of attribute
bundles on the basis of individual well-being.
Such an individual well-being ranking can be induced from any social rank-
ing that is complete: it is suﬃcient to consider how the social ranking evalu-
ates distributions in which all individuals have the same attribute bundle. In
2terms of the example above, the bundle (70,50) yields a lower (higher) level of
well-being than the bundle (120,30) if the social ranking considers the distribu-
tion ((70,50),(70,50),...,(70,50)) to be worse (better) than the distribution
((120,30),(120,30),...,(120,30)). The well-being ranking is common to all
individuals since they are identical except for their attribute bundles. We
propose to consider a version of the Pigou-Dalton principle that deﬁnes re-
gressivity in terms of the well-being concept that underlies the social ranking.
Because this version of the Pigou-Dalton principle is in this sense consistent
with the social ranking on which it is imposed, we refer to the new principle
as the “consistent Pigou-Dalton principle.” The principle is deﬁned in Section
3.
We investigate the eﬀect of imposing the consistent Pigou-Dalton principle
in the standard framework of social rankings satisfying anonymity, monotonic-
ity, and additive representability. Social rankings that satisfy the latter three
properties can be represented by a social welfare function which is a sum of
utilities: the utility function is the same for each individual and represents the
common well-being ranking alluded to above. The imposition of the consistent
Pigou-Dalton principle in this framework has the strong implication that the
common utility function is quasi-linear in the transferable attributes. This
result, which is our main result, is presented in Section 4.
We discuss the main result in the settings of the multidimensional inequal-
ity measurement literature and the needs literature, respectively. We start in
Section 5 with the multidimensional inequality measurement literature, which
usually assumes all attributes to be transferable. The consistent Pigou-Dalton
principle implies that social welfare has to be measured as the sum of utilities
of individual budgets, the latter deﬁned as a weighted sum of all attributes of
an individual. As such, the main result can be rephrased to provide a norma-
tive justiﬁcation of the concept of budget dominance (Kolm, 1977). Further-
more, we show that the resulting social ranking can never reverse the ranking
obtained using three majorization principles that have been proposed in the
normative approach to multidimensional inequality measurement, to wit, the
uniform majorization, the uniform Pigou-Dalton majorization, and the corre-
lation increasing majorization principles (see Weymark, 2006, for an overview).
In Section 6, we consider the needs literature, which typically assumes only
one attribute, usually income, to be transferable. In this setting, the con-
sistent Pigou-Dalton principle implies that social welfare has to be measured
as the sum of utilities of adjusted income, i.e., income adjusted for needs by
subtracting a certain amount, which depends on the non-income attributes,
from the nominal income. We show that this social ranking obeys Sen’s (1973)
weak equity axiom. Moreover, we discuss the necessity of using additive needs
corrections (also known as absolute equivalence scales) in the light of a recent
incompatibility result between welfarism and the so-called between type Pigou-
3Dalton transfer principle, a multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle
based on multiplicative needs corrections using so-called relative equivalence
scales (Ebert, 1997, Ebert and Moyes, 2003, Shorrocks, 2004). Finally, the so-
cial ranking also provides a normative justiﬁcation for a dominance criterion,
which turns out to coincide with Bourguignon’s (1989) dominance criterion
in case of a single non-transferable attribute, e.g., an ordinal needs index to
classify household types.
2 Notation
We consider a ﬁnite set M of at least two individuals and a non-empty ﬁnite set
A of attributes. We distinguish transferable from non-transferable attributes.
Whether or not an attribute is transferable is ultimately a normative choice:
an attribute is transferable if one believes that transferring attribute amounts
from better to worse oﬀ individuals, while preserving the total amount of this
attribute, is desirable. Income would be a typical example of a transferable
attribute, whereas subjective health status would be a typical example of a
possibly non-transferable attribute. The set T collects the transferable at-
tributes and is non-empty; the set N collects the non-transferable attributes;
A = T ∪N. Concerning the sets T and N, two extreme positions have received
considerable attention. First, the multidimensional inequality literature puts
N = ∅, i.e., only considers transferable attributes. Second, in the needs liter-
ature all attributes except for one are considered as non-transferable. In this
framework, income is considered as the single transferable attribute.
The variable that measures the amount of attribute k runs over some closed
interval Ak ⊂ R. As such, the domains AT and AN of transferable and non-
transferable attribute bundles are orthotopes, i.e., cartesian products of closed
intervals. The domain of attributes is1
A = Πk ∈TAk | {z }
AT
×Πk ∈NAk | {z }
AN
⊂ Πk ∈TR | {z }
RT
×Πk ∈NR | {z }
RN
.
Each attribute bundle x in A can be decomposed into (xT, xN) with xT in AT
the transferable part and xN in AN the non-transferable part. We extend this
decomposition to arbitrary vectors in RA and we write ε = (εT,εN) with εT in
RT and εN in RN.
Each individual i in M is endowed with some attribute bundle xi = (xi
k)k ∈A
in A. The number xi
k in Ak measures the amount of attribute k individual i is
endowed with. Superscripts refer to individuals and subscripts to attributes.
A distribution of attributes over the set of individuals is an |A|×|M| matrix X
with the attribute bundle xi at the ith column. The set D = AM is said to be
1The notation RA follows the notation BA for the collection of maps from a set A to a
set B.
4the domain of distributions. We assume that the attribute bundles completely
capture the relevant diﬀerences between the individuals. In other words, the
individuals are identical except for their attribute bundles.
Vector and matrix inequalities are denoted by ≥, >, and : we write
X ≥ Y if the inequality xi
k ≥ yi
k holds for each individual i and each attribute
k, X > Y if in addition at least one of the inequalities holds strictly, and
X  Y if all the inequalities hold strictly. We write 0 for zero vectors. For
two vectors x and y in R`, we write x · y for the sum x1y1 + x2y2 + ··· + x`y`.
A social ranking is a quasi-ordering % in D.2 The asymmetric and sym-
metric components of % are denoted by  and ∼, respectively.3 The social
ranking % induces a quasi-ordering in A. We denote this induced relation by
R%: for each x and y in A,
xR% y if and only if
 




y y ··· y

. (1)
It is compelling to interpret the relation R% as the ranking of attribute bundles
in terms of individual well-being that underlies the social ranking %. Since
individuals only diﬀer with respect to attribute bundles, a choice between two
distributions in which they all have the same attribute bundle boils down to
a choice of the best attribute bundle at the individual level. In case the social
ranking % in D is complete, then also the induced relation R% in A is complete.
The asymmetric part of R% is denoted by P%.
We now introduce three properties for a social ranking % of distributions.
Monotonicity and anonymity are natural requirements.
Monotonicity. For each X and Y in D, the matrix inequality X > Y implies
X  Y .
Anonymity. For each X in D, we have indiﬀerence between X and all distri-
butions that are equal to X up to a rearrangement of its columns (individuals).
Monotonicity makes sense in the multidimensional context if each attribute
is a good—not a bad. A monotonic social ranking registers an increase in an
attribute as an improvement. Anonymity imposes that the names of the indi-
viduals are not taken into account. This property presupposes that all relevant
characteristics of individual i are incorporated in the attribute bundle xi. In
other words, the relevant diﬀerences between the individuals are captured by
the attribute bundles. The third property incorporates completeness, continu-
ity, and separability.
2A transitive and reﬂexive binary relation is a quasi-ordering. A complete quasi-ordering
is an ordering.
3That is, X  Y if X % Y and not Y % X, and X ∼ Y if X % Y and Y % X.
5Additive representability. There exist C2-maps ui : A → R, one for each i
in M, such that, for each X and Y in D,











Imposing this property forces the social ranking to be complete, continuous
(hence, representable), and separable over individuals (in order to compare
two distributions, only those individuals who experience a change in their
attribute bundles are taken into account, individuals who experience a status
quo have no impact). The other way around, if the social ranking % satisﬁes
monotonicity, anonymity, continuity, and separability over individuals, then it
is representable as in (2) with ui = u for each i in M (Blackorby, Donaldson,
and Auersperg, 1981). This map u represents the ordering R% in A induced
by the social ranking % in D. The technical condition that the representation
involves C2—i.e., twice continuously diﬀerentiable—functions is not always
imposed upon the relation %. Here, we follow Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1982, 1987).
3 A consistent Pigou-Dalton principle
According to the unidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle, a small transfer from
poor to rich results in a distribution that is socially worse than the initial
distribution. We propose a multidimensional analogue as follows. First, we
select a quasi-ordering R in A. The relation R ranks attribute bundles in
terms of individual well-being. The R-Pigou-Dalton principle requires that
whenever an individual is—according to R—not worse oﬀ than another, then
a mean-preserving transfer in one or more attributes between these individuals
that is regressive in terms of well-being, decreases social welfare.
R-Pigou-Dalton principle. For each X and Y in D, for each i and j in M




··· xi + ε ··· xj − ε ···

,
with X and Y coinciding except for individuals i and j, then X  Y .
In this deﬁnition, the move from distribution X to distribution Y involves
a transfer from j to i. The restriction εN = 0 reﬂects that only transferable
attributes are involved. According to the relation R, individual i is not worse
oﬀ than j before the transfer and deﬁnitely better oﬀ than j after the transfer
(this at the cost of individual j). The unidimensional ≥-Pigou-Dalton principle
(with ≥ the natural ordering in R) coincides with the unidimensional Pigou-
Dalton principle. The normative contents of the R-Pigou-Dalton principle
6crucially depends on the choice of the quasi-ordering R in A. It seems natural
to choose R equal to the well-being concept underlying %, i.e., to choose R =
R%. We refer to this version of the R-Pigou-Dalton principle as the consistent
Pigou-Dalton principle.
Consistent Pigou-Dalton principle. The social ranking % in D satisﬁes the
consistent Pigou-Dalton principle if it satisﬁes the R%-Pigou-Dalton principle,
where the quasi-ordering R% in A is induced by the social ranking % in D as
in (1).
Note that a unidimensional social ranking % satisﬁes the consistent Pigou-
Dalton principle if and only if the relation R% coincides with ≥, i.e., if and
only if the social ranking % satisﬁes a weak form of monotonicity (if X  Y ,
then X  Y ).
4 Main result
The next theorem investigates the eﬀect of imposing monotonicity, anonymity,
additive representability, and the consistent Pigou-Dalton principle upon a
social ranking of distributions.
Theorem 1. A social ranking % satisﬁes monotonicity, anonymity, additive
representability, and the consistent Pigou-Dalton principle if and only if there
exists
• a vector pT in RT with pT  0,
• a strictly increasing and strictly concave C2-map ϕ : R → R, and
• a C2-map ψ : AN → R which is strictly increasing in each variable,
such that, for each X and Y in D, we have























Proof. The particular representation of the social ranking % satisﬁes the four
conditions. We focus on the reverse implication. Therefore, let % be an order-
ing in D that satisﬁes the four conditions.
Since the social ranking % is anonymous, monotonic, and additive separa-
ble, it can be represented by a C2-map on the domain of distributions:





7with u : A → R a strictly increasing function that represents the induced
ordering R%. The monotonicity of the relation % implies the monotonicity of
R% (if x > y, then xP%y).
Next, we study the indiﬀerence surfaces of the map u. The monotonicity
of R% implies that the indiﬀerence surfaces are thin.
Let t ∈ T. Let x and y in A satisfy u(x) ≥ u(y). The consistent Pigou-
Dalton principle implies that the distribution
 
x y z ··· z

is socially pre-
ferred to the distribution
 
x + ε y − ε z ··· z

with ε in RA, εt > 0, and
εk = 0 for each k 6= t. Given additive representability, it follows that
u(y) − u(y − ε) > u(x + ε) − u(x) > 0.
Divide by εt, take the limits for εt to 0, and obtain Dtu(y) ≥ Dtu(x) ≥ 0. In
sum,
for each t in T, if u(x) ≥ u(y), then 0 ≤ Dtu(x) ≤ Dtu(y).
Let x and y belong to the same indiﬀerence surface. Then, u(x) ≥ u(y),
u(y) ≥ u(x), and the partial derivative with respect to a transferable attribute
is a constant, Dtu(x) = Dtu(y). The derivative Dtu(x) does not depend upon
the particular position of the vector x in A. The utility level u(x) completely
determines the derivative Dtu(x).
As a consequence, for each t in T and for each x in A, it holds that
Dtu(x) = Vt(u(x)), with V : R → (R+)T a vector valued map. Diﬀeren-










Because the map u is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, we have DsDtu =


















Therefore, on the image set of u, it holds that D[ln◦Vt ] = D[ln◦Vs ], or that
Vs = pstVt with pst > 0. In conclusion,









with pT in RT, pT  0 (pst = ps/pt > 0), and with v a decreasing map from R
to R+.
Eliminate in (3) the term v(u(x)) and obtain Dtu(x) = (pt/ps)Dsu(x) for
each s and t in T. This is a system of |T|−1 linear ﬁrst order partial diﬀerential
equations. The solution is
u(x) = ˜ ϕ(pT · xT,xN),
8with the map ˜ ϕ from R×RN to R strictly increasing in each variable. The map
˜ ϕ is strictly concave in its ﬁrst argument. Indeed, if D1˜ ϕ(z,xN) = D1˜ ϕ(z0,xN)
with z0 > z, then a small progressive transfer might result in the same social
welfare. This contradicts the Pigou-Dalton principle. Furthermore, the map v
satisﬁes D1˜ ϕ = v ◦ ˜ ϕ and is strictly decreasing.
In the particular case where N is empty, we are done. The map ϕ = ˜ ϕ has
the properties stated in the theorem, and the social ranking is represented by





In the case where N is not empty, we return to equation (3) and plug in
the map ˜ ϕ. We obtain





for each z in R between the minimum and the maximum value of pT ·xT. The




= z + ψ(xN),
with ψ an arbitrary map from RN to R.4 It follows that ˜ ϕ(z,xN) depends upon
z + ψ(xN) rather than upon z and xN separately. In conclusion: ˜ ϕ(z,xN) =
ϕ(z + ψ(xN)) and the social ranking is represented by












with ϕ and ψ as stated in the theorem. 2
As Theorem 1 shows, the imposition of the consistent Pigou-Dalton prin-
ciple in an additively separable framework strongly limits the possibilities to
rank distributions in D: the induced well-being ranking in A obtains a quasi-
linear structure. The next two sections apply this result to the framework
of multidimensional inequality measurement and to the framework of needs,
respectively.
5 Multidimensional inequality measurement
The literature on multidimensional social evaluation assumes that each at-
tribute is transferable, A = T and N = ∅. Imposing the four properties
results in the following criterion: for each X and Y in D,















4See Polyanin, Zaitsev, and Moussiaux (2002).
9with ϕ : R → R a strictly increasing and strictly concave C2-map, and p  0 in
RT. From here, we distinguish the dominance approach (5.1) and the norma-
tive approach (5.2). For surveys of these two approaches, we refer to Trannoy
(2006) and Weymark (2006), respectively.
5.1. In the dominance approach, the Lorenz dominance criterion plays a cen-
tral role. We recall the generalized Lorenz criterion and the budget dominance
relation.
Generalized Lorenz criterion. Let a and b be two n-tuples of real numbers.
Denote the ordered coordinates of a by ah1i ≤ ah2i ≤ ··· ≤ ahni (similar for b).
Then a is said to generalized Lorenz dominate b—denoted a %GL b—if one
of the following equivalent conditions is fulﬁlled (Kolm, 1969, Marshall and
Olkin, 1979, Shorrocks, 1983):
• ah1i + ah2i + ··· + ahki ≥ bh1i + bh2i + ··· + bhki for each k = 1,2,...,n,
• g(a1)+g(a2)+···+g(an) ≥ g(b1)+g(b2)+···+g(bn) for each C2-map
g : R → R that is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Budget dominance. Let X and Y be two distributions in D. Then, X is








i∈M for each p  0.
Interpret p in RT as a price vector and the inner product bi = p · xi as the
budget of individual i. Then, distribution X budget dominates distribution Y
if, for each price vector, the distribution of budgets induced by X generalized
Lorenz dominates the distribution of budgets induced by Y .
Recall the relation described by (4) and compare it with the deﬁnitions
of the generalized Lorenz criterion and budget dominance. Theorem 1 allows
us to rephrase the concept of budget dominance in terms of the consistent
Pigou-Dalton principle. We obtain the following normative underpinning for
the concept of budget dominance.
Corollary 1. Let each attribute be transferable. Let X and Y be two dis-
tributions in D. Then, X %B Y if and only if X % Y for each social ranking
% that satisﬁes monotonicity, anonymity, additive representability, and the
consistent Pigou-Dalton principle.
5.2. Although the functional form (2) is frequently used as a starting point
in the normative approach to multidimensional inequality measurement, the
relation described in (4) hardly receives any attention.
10We investigate the relationship between the consistent Pigou-Dalton prin-
ciple and three other multidimensional principles, to wit, the uniform ma-
jorization principle, the uniform Pigou-Dalton majorization principle, and the
correlation increasing majorization principle.
First, we introduce some additional notation. Let I denote the |M| × |M|
identity matrix. A non-negative square matrix is said to be bistochastic if all of
its row and column sums are equal to 1. A bistochastic matrix with only zeros
and ones is a permutation matrix. The permutation matrix that interchanges
the i and j coordinates is denoted by Ii,j. Furthermore, a strict t-transform is
a linear transformation deﬁned by an |M| × |M| matrix S of the form
S = λI + (1 − λ)Ii,j with λ in (0,1).
In this notation, anonymity postulates that post-multiplying a distribution by
a permutation matrix results in an equally good distribution. The uniform
majorization principle requires that post-multiplying a distribution by a non-
permutation bistochastic matrix increases social welfare. The uniform Pigou-
Dalton majorization principle demands that post-multiplying a distribution by
a strict t-transform increases social welfare.
Uniform majorization principle. For each X in D and for each non-
permutation bistochastic matrix B, we have XB  X.
Uniform Pigou-Dalton majorization principle. For each X in D and for
each strict t-transform S, we have XS  X.
The uniform Pigou-Dalton majorization principle is weaker than the uni-
form majorization principle. Indeed, each strict t-transform is a non-permutat-
ion bistochastic matrix while the converse does not hold (Marshall and Olkin,
1979, p. 431).
It appears that social rankings of the form (4) do not satisfy these majoriza-
tion principles. We illustrate this claim using a counterexample. Let there be

















Both uniform majorization principles rank Y strictly higher than X (the matrix
S deﬁnes a strict t-transfer with λ = 0.5). On the other hand, each social
ranking of the form (4) with weights p1 = p2 judges X and Y as equally good.
This example easily extends to more individuals and more attributes. On the
other hand, the consistent Pigou-Dalton principle is compatible with the weak
versions (with  replaced by %) of the two majorization principles. The next
proposition captures this phenomenon.
11Proposition 1. Let each attribute be transferable. Let % be a social rank-
ing that satisﬁes monotonicity, anonymity, additive representability, and the
consistent Pigou-Dalton principle. Then, for each X in D and for each non-
permutation bistochastic matrix B, we have XB % X.
Proof. Let X in D be a distribution, b the corresponding M-tuple of budgets,
and B an |M| × |M| non-permutation bistochastic matrix.
The properties of ϕ imply that the map W : a 7→
P
i∈M ϕ(ai), which
represents the social ranking, is strictly Schur-concave.5 Indeed, for each i and
j in M and for each M-tuple a, we have
a
i > a
j implies DiW(a) < DjW(a).
It follows that W(bB) > W(b) except for the particular case in which bB and
B are identical up to a permutation (implying that W(bB) = W(b)). 2
The above proof reveals that the case XB ∼ X occurs if and only if there
exists a permutation π : M → M such that each individual i in M is—
according to the induced relation R%—indiﬀerent between his attribute bundle
xi (the ith column in X) and the π(i)th column in XB.
We close this section by comparing the consistent Pigou-Dalton principle
with the correlation increasing majorization principle of Tsui (1999). For each
x and y in RA, let x ∧ y = (min{xk,yk})k ∈A and x ∨ y = (max{xk,yk})k ∈A.
Correlation increasing majorization. For each X and Y in D, and for
each i and j in M, we have that if
Y =
 
··· xi ∨ xj ··· xi ∧ xj ···

6= X,
with X and Y coinciding except for individuals i and j, then X  Y .
Note that in the above deﬁnition, individual i is better oﬀ than j in dis-
tribution Y . Under the assumption that each attribute is transferable, the
above principle—in combination with anonymity—boils down to Tsui’s (1999)
dependence-sensitivity axiom.6 The move from distribution Y to X involves
the transfer (xj − xi) ∨ 0 from individual i to j. Therefore, the consistent
5A map f : D ⊂ Rn → R is said to be strictly Schur-concave if f(yB) > f(y) for each y
in D and each n×n non-permutation bistochastic matrix B for which the n-tuple yB is not
a rearrangement of y. Marshall and Olkin (1979) provide the equivalent conditions that we
use.
6Tsui’s deﬁnition permits transfers as described in the deﬁnition of correlation increas-
ing majorization in combination with rearrangements of the individuals. Therefore, the
anonymity principle is needed in order to arrive at Tsui’s deﬁnition. In the presence of
anonymity, the restriction xiRxj in the deﬁnition of correlation increasing majorization is
redundant.
12Pigou-Dalton principle—in combination with anonymity—implies the corre-
lation increasing majorization principle. The next proposition formulates this
observation.
Proposition 2. Let each attribute be transferable. Let % be a complete social
ranking that satisﬁes anonymity and the consistent Pigou-Dalton principle.
Then, % satisﬁes the correlation increasing majorization principle.
6 The needs framework
The starting point in the needs literature is the assumption that mean-preserv-
ing transfers only make sense for incomes. Let the income level appear as the
ﬁrst coordinate in the attribute bundle. Imposing the four properties results
in the following criterion: for each X and Y in D,























the map ϕ : R → R is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and C2, and the map
ψ : AN → R is strictly increasing and C2. Theorem 1 extends and allows for
diﬀerent income-dimensions. Nevertheless, we focus on the criterion expressed
in (5) with one single income variable. From here, we distinguish between
the literature following Sen’s (1973) weak equity axiom (6.1), the cardinal
equivalence scale literature (6.2), and the ordinal equivalence scale literature
(6.3).
6.1. In his book “On economic inequality,” Sen (1973) deﬁnes a utilitarian






N). All the relevant non-income variables (xi
N) are compressed
in the superscript i of the utility function Ui. He argues that such a utili-
tarian approach is a blunt approach to rank multidimensional income distri-
butions because it conﬂicts with a simple notion of equity, the so-called weak
equity principle. This principle states that if some individual has higher needs
compared to another—i.e., a lower utility level for all income levels—, then
the former should receive more income than the latter when dividing a ﬁxed
amount of income.
The consistent Pigou-Dalton principle implies the weak equity principle.
Suppose one individual is worse oﬀ compared to another for all income levels.
Then, any distribution of income which would give strictly more to the latter
cannot be optimal according to a social ranking obeying the consistent Pigou-
Dalton principle, because such a distribution is strictly inferior to a distribution
obtained by transferring a small amount of income from the latter to the
former.
13As a consequence, also the social ranking in (5) must obey the weak equity
principle. The other way around, Theorem 1 tells us that utilitarianism can be
equity-regarding in a consistent way only if the utility functions have a speciﬁc
quasi-linear structure.
6.2. In contrast with Sen’s ordinal notion of needs based on utility levels—
i.e., higher needs correspond with a lower utility level for all income levels—,
the cardinal equivalence scale literature tries to quantify the needs diﬀerences.
For an attribute bundle xi, the correction term ψ(xi
N) in (5) adjusts income
for needs in an additive, rather than a multiplicative, way: higher values corre-
spond with lower needs. In the equivalence scale literature, the additive correc-
tion is called an absolute equivalence scale, while the multiplicative correction
is called a relative equivalence scale. Furthermore, the additive correction term
ψ(xi
N) is exact, i.e., it does not depend on the income level xi
1.
The use of exact and absolute equivalence scales as in (5) is the only way
to reconcile utilitarianism with a notion of equity. This sheds some light on
an incompatibility result between welfarism and the so-called between type
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. This equity principle is what we have called
an R-Pigou-Dalton principle, where the exogenous well-being ranking R is
based on relative, rather than absolute, equivalence scales. As a result, there
are two conﬂicting rankings—one exogenous (R) and one induced (R%)—
to assess individual well-being. As shown by Ebert (1997), Ebert and Moyes
(2003), and Shorrocks (2004), this inner contradiction ultimately conﬂicts with
the welfarist nature of utilitarianism, which requires a unique utility metric.7
6.3. As an alternative to Sen’s ordinal notion of needs based on utility levels
(see 6.1 above), the ordinal needs literature proposes a notion based on utility
diﬀerences. More precisely, higher needs correspond with a higher marginal
utility of income. We present the criteria due to Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1987) and Bourguignon (1989); we follow Ebert’s (2000) presentation.
The marginal distribution of needs is taken to be ﬁxed. Hence, we compare
distributions X and Y in D with the same non-transferable attributes, i.e.,
xi
N = yi
N for each individual i in M. The set M of individuals is partitioned
into diﬀerent needs groups from least to most needy. Let κ denote the number
of diﬀerent classes of needs types. This ordinal needs ranking presupposes the
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7See Cap´ eau and Ooghe (2006) for a reconciliation of welfarism and the between type
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle in a non-utilitarian setting.
14The partitioning M = M1 ∪ M2 ∪ ··· ∪ Mκ depends upon ψ. If there is only
one non-transferable attribute, e.g., an ordinal index which is inversely related
to needs, then there is no dispute about how to partition individuals in needs
groups: each increasing function ψ induces the same ordering and the same
partition. Next, individuals in the same needs group have the same utility
function which is C2. A proﬁle is a κ-tuple U = (U1,U2,...,Uκ) of utility
functions from R+ to R, one for each needs group.
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) and Bourguignon (1989) deﬁne—for a
given proﬁle U of utility functions—the total welfare WU(X) of a distribution

















Furthermore, distribution X is said to dominate distribution Y if, for each
proﬁle U of utility functions with 0 ≤ U0
1 ≤ U0
2 ≤ ··· ≤ U0
κ and U00
k ≤ 0
for each k, we have WU(X) ≥ WU(Y ). The conditions U0
k ≤ U0
k+1 for each
k = 1,2,...,κ − 1 ensure that higher needs correspond with higher marginal
utilities of income. If X dominates Y , then we write X %ψ Y ; the subscript ψ
refers to the map behind the partitioning in diﬀerent needs groups. The next
proposition shows that the social ranking %ψ can be interpreted as unanimity
among utilitarian welfare functions based on a wide set of absolute equivalence
scales; see Fleurbaey et al. (2003) for a characterization based on relative
equivalence scales.
Proposition 3. Let there be exactly one transferable attribute (attribute 1)
and at least one non-transferable attribute. Let X and Y be two distributions
in D with xi
N = yi
N for each i in M. Let the map ψ : AN → R be strictly























for each strictly increasing and strictly concave map ϕ and for each strictly
increasing map ϑ.
Proof. The utility functions t 7→ ϕ(t + ϑ ◦ ψ(xi
N)) generate a proﬁle that
satisﬁes the imposed conditions. Hence, the “if-then” implication follows. The
reverse implication is more involved.
The map ψ partitions the individuals in κ diﬀerent needs groups. Let FX,k
be the distribution in X of incomes for the kth needs group. The distribution
FX,k has a ﬁnite support. Let pk be the marginal distribution of the needs








































for each strictly increasing and strictly concave C2-map ϕ and for each κ-tuple
(m1,m2,...,mκ) of real numbers with m1 > m2 > ··· > mκ. In each integral








FX,k(t − mk) − FY,k(t − mk)

≥ 0.
Lambert (2001, p. 54, Lemma 3.1) shows that this inequality holds for each
strictly increasing and strictly concave map ϕ and for each κ-tuple m of real










for each κ-tuple m of real numbers with m1 > m2 > ··· > mκ and for each real
number t; or—equivalently—for each κ-tuple (t1,t2,...,tκ) of real numbers
with t1 < t2 < ··· < tκ. In this ﬁnal condition, we recognize Bourguignon’s
(1989) criterion,8 which he shows to be equivalent to WU(X) ≥ WU(Y ) for
each proﬁle U = (U1,U2,...,Uκ) of utility functions that satisfy 0 ≤ U0
1 ≤
U0
2 ≤ ··· ≤ U0
κ and U00
k ≤ 0 for each k = 1,2,...,κ. 2
The next corollary provides a normative justiﬁcation for a generalization
of Bourguignon’s criterion.
Corollary 2. Let there be exactly one transferable attribute (attribute 1) and
at least one non-transferable attribute. Let X and Y be two distributions in D
such that xi
N = yi
N for each i in M. Then, X %ψ Y for each strictly increasing
C2-map ψ : AN → R if and only if X % Y for each social ranking % that
satisﬁes monotonicity, anonymity, additive representability, and the consistent
Pigou-Dalton principle.




−∞(FX,k(z) − FY,k(z))dz ≤ 0 for each κ-tuple
(t1,t2,...,tκ) of real numbers with t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ··· ≤ tκ. As each map t 7→
R t
−∞(FX,k(z) −
FY,k(z))dz is continuous, the strict inequalities can be replaced by weak inequalities.
16If there is only one non-transferable attribute, e.g., an ordinal index in-
versely related to needs, then Bourguignon’s criterion turns out to be equiva-
lent with unanimity among all social rankings satisfying the above mentioned
properties. If there are two or more non-transferable attributes, then one
should check Bourguignon’s criterion for each ordinal classiﬁcation of individ-
uals in needs groups that guarantees the implication “if xi
N < x
j
N, then i has
higher needs than j.”
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